INTRODUCTION
One of the conventions which has come to distinguish experimental economics from experimental psychology is that economics experiments typically attempt to control subjects' incentives by using monetary payoffs based on performance.2 It is thus natural that one of the most frequent questions about experimental economics concerns whether behavior observed when monetary incentives are relatively low can be generalized to similar environments with much higher risks and rewards. One way to address this is by within-experiment comparisons of behavior under widely different financial incentives, holding all else constant. The wider the range of payoffs the more powerful is the experiment at detecting potential differences in behavior that might be due to the size of the incentives. It is therefore attractive to conduct experiments in countries where the wage levels are relatively low, so that subjects can be given large financial incentives with a given experimental budget.
The design of the present experiment takes advantage of this observation to increase the power of the experiment to detect differences in behavior due to differences in stakes. Unlike previous high stakes experiments, the present experiment will give subjects an opportunity to play the game multiple times (with different partners) so that the effects of learning-which may magnify the effects of high stakes can be observed.
Higher financial stakes might matter for several reasons. High stakes might reduce responders' willingness to 'punish' a given disproportionate offer, since it would raise the financial cost of indulging in such behavior. Likewise, high stakes might cause proposers to make proportionally less fair (smaller) offers to responders because higher stakes will raise the financial cost to make proportionally fairer offers. Also, proposers might make smaller proportional offers if they believe responders are more likely to accept a given disproportionate offer.5 Hence, high stakes might move behavior towards the perfect equilibrium.
Controlled experiments reporting within-experiment comparisons of ultimatum games played for different stakes have generally found little effect on either offers or rejection frequencies. Roth et al. (1991) examined games played for $10 and for $30, and noticed no important difference. Straub and Murnighan (1995) also found little difference in proposer or responder behavior in ultimatum games between $5 and $100.6 Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) found no significant difference in offers or rejection frequencies between $10 and $100 stakes in ultimatum games with either a random entitlement or contest treatment to determine the proposer. And Cameron (1995) found no difference in either proposer or responder behavior when stakes were changed from 5,000 to 200,000 Indonesian Rupiahs.
Except in Roth et al. (1991) (which considered only a modest variation in stakes), subjects in the experiments described above had no opportunity to obtain experience.7 The results of Roth et al. suggest that the ultimatum game is a game in which experience serves to magnify initially small differences in behavior, and Roth and Erev (1995) present a learning model that predicts this. The current experiment therefore looks not only at a larger difference in stakes (a factor of 25) than has (with the exception of Cameron (1995)) previously been examined, but also looks at the effect of the difference as subjects gain experience. If the predictions of the learning model are correct, the interaction 5However, larger stakes may induce risk averse proposers to offer a greater share of the pie to avoid losing the greater monetary payoffs. 6Straub and Murnighan (1995) found, in their complete information condition, that the mean (median) lowest acceptable offer was constant at approximately 20% (15%) of the financial stakes level for pies of $10 to $100, in which subjects might get paid. The mean (median) lowest acceptable offer drops below 20% (15%) for stakes of $1,000 and $1,000,000 in hypothetical questions. The mean (median) offer was constant at approximately 40% (50%) for stakes between $5 and $80 and drops to about 35% (40%) for larger hypothetical stakes. 7Hoffman et al. (1996) investigated a one-shot environment in which subjects play one game, Straub and Murnighan (1995) obtained multiple offers and minimum acceptable offers from every subject, but subjects never received feedback from an opponent, and Cameron's (1995) subjects played two games, but with different stakes. of stakes and experience should increase the power of the experiment to detect difference in behavior due to differences in the financial incentives. 8 An additional advantage of having multiple (although nonindependent) observations per subject, even in the absence of learning, is that we are able to more precisely measure subtle differences in behavior caused by higher stakes. We find the rejections were less frequent the higher the stakes, and proposals in the high stakes conditions decline as proposers gained experience. The ability to detect a significant difference in rejection frequency across stakes, which had eluded previous experimenters, can be explained by the added power the current design provides. With the larger number of observations in the current design we are able to observe many slightly unequal proposals which are rejected only slightly less frequently when stakes are higher, and we are also able to observe a few very unequal proposals which are rejected much less frequently when stakes are higher. And this difference in rejection frequencies, together with the opportunity which the experiment provides for proposers to learn from experience, allows us to detect differences in proposer behavior across stakes also.
The experimental design also includes sessions studying the market game examined by Roth et al. (1991) . The market game consists of players simultaneously making sealed bids for an indivisible object which has the same value to all players. The player who makes the highest bid earns the difference between the object's value and the highest bid, while all other bidders earn zero.9 The perfect equilibrium involves bidders bidding away all or almost all the wealth. Roth et al. (1991) observed that behavior in the market game, unlike the ultimatum game, robustly and quickly converged to the perfect equilibrium as players gained experience. We included the market game sessions because high stakes could have a different effect on behavior in the two games; in the market game high stakes give bidders more incentive to try to establish some implicit cooperation to keep bids down. Thus high stakes might cause behavior to move less towards perfect equilibrium in the market game and more towards perfect equilibrium in the ultimatum game. However, in the market game we could not detect any differences due to stakes; in all stakes conditions the transaction price quickly went to and remained at the perfect equilibrium. Because the results are very similar to those reported in Roth et al. (1991) , the market game results will not be discussed in further detail. 8For some relevant review papers see Guth and Tietz (1990) , and Roth (1995b). The paper by Fudenberg and Levine (1997) explores a nuanced approach to the issue of learning as a function of the costs of "irrational" behavior. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and equilibrium predictions for the ultimatum game, and Section 3 presents the experimental results, including a discussion of statistical power in different experimental designs. Section 4 briefly discusses how the results relate to learning behavior, and Section 5 concludes.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS
In the ultimatum game, subjects participated in a sequence of ten games against different anonymous opponents.10 During the ten game session a subject learned only the results of his or her own negotiations. Each subject was randomly assigned to be a proposer or responder, and a subject played the same role throughout the ten game session. In all games the pie was 1000 points and proposed divisions could be made in units of 5 points (0, 5, 10,... 995, 1000). The exchange rate for 1000 points was 60, 300, or 1500 Slovak Crowns (Sk), depending on the session. Ten ultimatum sessions were conducted, three at 60 Sk, four at 300 Sk, and three at 1500 Sk.
The subgame perfect assumption (with the additional assumption that subjects only want to maximize their monetary payoffs) means the responder will accept any positive offer, since rejecting any positive offer is inconsistent with wanting to maximize monetary reward. Since the smallest positive amount a proposer can offer is 5 points, no proposer will offer more than 5 points because responder will surely accept that amount. Thus, two subgame perfect equilibria exist: in one, proposer offers responder 5 points and keeps 995 for himself, and responder accepts (but would have rejected an offer of 0 points). In the other, proposer offers responder 0 points and responder accepts.1"
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A quick summary of our results is that, consistent with previous ultimatum game results (e.g., Straub and Murnigham (1995) , Hoffmann et al. (1996) , and Cameron (1995), we detect no significant difference between low and high stakes proposals or between low and high stakes rejection frequencies when examining inexperienced behavior (i.e., behavior in the first period). However, using all ten periods, we observe for the first time that responders in higher stakes reject proportionally equivalent offers less often, although rejections still occur even when substantial financial loss results. And when learning is examined, stakes also make a difference for proposals; offers decline in the higher stakes treatments as proposers gain experience. These results are described in more detail next. '0See Slonim (1995) for a complete description of the experimental design and procedures for the ultimatum sessions, which duplicate those described in Roth et al. (1991) .
1" In addition, in the ultimatum game any price can be observed at an imperfect Nash equilibrium. Notes: The number in parentheses below each percenit offer is the number of offers made in the range and the number in parentheses below percent rejected is the number of offers rejected in the range. The average (7 exclusions) removes all offers of the six subjects that made more than four offers greater than 50% and also excludes the one subject that made the offer of .5% of the pie in every round. To test responder behavior, we only investigate offers of less than 50%. For offers of 50% (or more), we predict (on the basis of earlier experiments) that virtually all offers will be accepted, regardless of pie size, and thus do not expect any difference due to stakes.'2 For offers less than 50%, responders may obtain utility not only from monetary payoffs, but also from punishing an unfair offer.'3 Higher stakes may decrease rejections if the monetary reward dominates punishment value at higher stakes while punishment value dominates the monetary reward at lower stakes. (However, stakes may not have this effect if, as stakes increase, a responder's utility from punishing a proportionally small offer rises at least as much as his utility from money increases.) First Round Behavior: A number of previous studies of ultimatum games compare aggregate rejection rates for different stakes. In the present experiment, for all disproportionate offers made in the first round, 21% (3/14), 5% (1/20), and 27% (4/15) were rejected by low, middle, and high stakes responders, respectively. None of the pairwise differences are significant.'4 This result is similar to previous ultimatum game results discussed above. One concern with this result is the power to detect differences due to sample size; recall, there are 24, 33, and 25 responders in the three conditions and only 59.8% (49/82) of the offers in the first period are less than 50%.15 A second concern is that differences in proportions offered between conditions are ignored. For example, there are no offers less than 30% in the lowest stakes in the first round, whereas there are five offers less than 30% in the middle and high stakes, and 4 of these offers are rejected, constituting all but one of the rejections by middle and high stakes responders. Thus, looking at overall rejection rates may hide differences that exist among proportionally similar offers.
To control for proportionally equivalent offers, the following logit models were investigated for first period rejection behavior:
(1) Reject =f(a + boff * off ), 15Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) had a similar sample size (24 and 27 subjects in $10 and $100 conditions) and similar results for a one shot game with random entitlement: 12.5% (3/24) and 18.5% (5/27) of offers were rejected in their low and high stakes, respectively. marginal change in rejections from the lowest to middle stakes) and pieH = 1 if stakes are 1500 and 0 otherwise. The first model tests whether the proportion offered influences the probability of an offer being rejected, restricting the effect of stakes to have the same influence on rejections. Model 2 tests whether stakes influence rejections, controlling for the proportional offer. Table II reports logit regression results. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for models 1 and 2, respectively. Subgame perfection predicts all positive offers will be accepted; thus the null hypothesis is b,ff = 0. If smaller proportional offers are rejected more often, then b,ff < 0 (i.e., larger proportional offers are rejected less often). In both models, boff is significantly less than 0, indicating smaller offers are more likely to be rejected (models 1 and 2, p < .01).
Model 2 tests the effect of stakes on rejections. If stakes have no influence on rejections, then b,1 =bl = 0. If higher stakes reduce the likelihood that an offer will be rejected, then b1, < bi < 0. Model 2 results indicate that middle stakes responders are least likely to reject an offer and lowest stakes responders are most likely (bm, = -4.61 < bh = -1.17 < 0). Although, high and middle stakes responders are directionally less likely to reject offers than low stakes respon- In summary, we cannot reject that increasing stakes has no effect on the rejection rate in the first round. However, by looking at behavior across rounds, we can more powerfully investigate behavior for proportionally similar offers.
Behavior Across Rounds: In offer ranges less than 50% shown in Table I where off, pieM, and pieH are defined above. Avreii equals the average number of offers rejected by subject i, excluding the current offer.17 Avreji is included to capture individual rejection propensity differences, since multiple observations of the same individual are not independent.18 We expect bavrej > 0; the more 16The model 2 X2 test result indicates that compared to the restricted model 1 with bm = bi, = 0, the likelihood that an offer will be rejected is significantly different across the three stakes conditions (p = .046). However, since model 2 parameter estimates indicate that middle stakes responders are less likely than high stakes responders to reject an offer, we cannot conclude that higher stakes cause offers to be rejected more often. Combining the middle and high stakes (i.e., restricting b,. = bl), but otherwise using a model identical to model 2, higher stakes marginally decrease the likelihood of an offer being rejected (p = .09). However, we have no a priori reason to combine these two conditions and combining the lower two stakes conditions (i.e., restricting b, = 0), but otherwise using a model identical to model 2, higher stakes (insignificantly) increase the likelihood of an offer being rejected (p =.43). In other words, middle stakes responders are less likely than either low or high stakes responders to reject an offer in period 1. Thus, depending on how we aggregate the three stakes conditions, we may draw different conclusions. When we analyze all ten rounds, this concern disappears. The limited number of disproportionate offers in period 1 stresses the importance of the low power to detect differences. This low power using just one period will be demonstrated below.
17For example, responder 211 received offers less than 500 in rounds 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 and rejected offers in rounds 4 and 5. Avrej911 thus equals .50 (2/4) in rounds 2, 6, and 8 and equals .25 (1/4) in rounds 4 and 5.
18Since 24, 33, and 25 subjects are in the three respective stakes conditions, the sample size is too small to use a random effects model to control for subject effects. Since subjects are nested within a single stakes condition, and further, since 38% (9/24), 52% (17/33), and 56% (14/25) of the subjects in the respective stakes conditions never reject an offer, a fixed effects model to control for subject effects is inappropriate (i.e., there is no variance for subjects who never reject). The variable av7eji is thus used as a proxy to control for subject effects. often subjects reject other offers, the more often they will reject the current offer.
Column 3 and 4 of Table II Table I . The model predicts that the higher the stakes, the less likely an offer will be rejected. The graph shows that the largest absolute difference between stakes in the likelihood to reject occurs for moderately disproportionate offers and that the smallest absolute difference occurs for offers very close to an equal split and for extremely disproportionate offers. For example, an offer of 45% (close to an equal split) is predicted to be rejected 9.4% of the time by low stakes responders and 1.5% of the time by high stakes responders. Similarly, an offer of 5% (an extremely disproportionate offer) is predicted to be rejected 99.2% of the time by low stakes responders and 94.4% of the time by high stakes responders. The absolute difference is much wider for moderately disproportionate offers; for example, an offer of 25% is predicted to be rejected 77.8% of the time by low stakes responders but only 33.4% of the time by high stakes responders.
To test whether rejection rates changed over time, we investigate two specifications: Model 5 investigates whether rejections increase or decrease over time by including the variable round; round equals 1 for round 1, equals 2 for round 2, 19We also tested whether the effect of offers on rejections depends on the stakes condition by including in model 4 the interaction terms offer by pieM and offer by pieH. The results of this test were that neither interaction term had any influence on rejections (p > .90 for both interaction terms), indicating that the effect of offers on rejections is independent of the stakes condition (and that the effect of stakes on rejections is independent of the offer).
20 Figure 2 assumes the average rejection rate (aLtreji) for a hypothetical responder is at the mean of all experimental responders for each condition: 25.6%, 16.0%, and 13.0% in the low, middle, and high stakes conditions, respectively (see Table I , offers < 500). were significantly different than all other rounds; rejections were marginally higher in the 6th round (p = .062) and significantly lower in the tenth round (p =.019). 22 We interpret 6th round behavior as likely due to noise. The significantly lower rejection rate in the last round may signify an end effect or may also be noise. Thus, round has no systematic effect on rejections over time.
Statistical power: One question that naturally arises from the preceding analysis is why no significant differences in rejection frequencies are detected between stakes in the first period (or in one-shot experiments) whereas across all ten rounds we detect significantly fewer rejections in the higher stakes. One hypothesis is that there was an interaction effect in which rejection rates decreased over time in higher stakes more than in the low stakes. We tested this hypothesis by including the interaction of round by middle stakes and round by high stakes in model 5. However, neither interaction term has any effect on rejections (p > .90 for both interactions), indicating that the effect of round on rejections is the same across stakes conditions; i.e., the relative difference in the frequency of rejections between stakes is constant across rounds.23
Since stakes have an overall effect on rejections, but the difference is not observed in the first period nor is it observed to change over time, the inability to detect a significant difference in the first period (or in one shot experiments) may be due to low power.24 The low power is likely caused by the fact that only small differences in responder behavior occur for offers near an equal split (recall Figure 2 and that the absolute difference between low and high stakes responders rejecting an offer of 45% is less than 10%) combined with the observation that the majority of offers are near the equal split ( Table I reports that over 75% (626/820) of all offers are at least 40%). Thus, detecting a difference in responder behavior requires many observations to detect the small differences for nearly equal offers or to generate enough very unequal offers for which the difference in responder behavior is large.
To investigate the power to detect a significant difference, we generated 500 simulated data sets based on the model 4 results in which high stakes responders are less likely to reject proportionally equivalent offers than low stakes respon22To test whether a round was distinct from all other rounds, ten separate regressions were run, each time including only one dummy variable for each round.
23We also ran models 1 and 2 for tenth period behavior in order to test whether stakes had a significant effect on rejection frequencies that may have developed after ten periods. However, no substantive differences between the model results for the first period behavior or tenth period behavior were observed; in both the first and tenth period lower offers significantly cause higher rejection frequencies and stakes have no significant effect on rejections. Thus, the effect of stakes on rejections appears to be constant across rounds. 24For example, Hoffman et al. had 24 and 27 responders in their one shot random entitlement ultimatum game, nearly identical in size to our 24, 33, and 25 responders in the low, middle, and high stakes conditions-and they observed 12% (3/24) and 18.5% (5/27) rejections in their low and high conditions, also similar to the 21%, 5%, and 27% we observed in the low to high conditions. Notes: The percent listed in each cell represents the power to detect a significant difference for the parameter estimate listed in the column header at the a significance level listed for the row. For example, the power to detect that b,, * 0 at the 10% significance level for the 1 Period Slovak Sample Size is 15%. In other words, if the identical experiment is run agaiin, then there is a 15% likelihood that we would detect a difference between the rejection rate of the middle and low stakes responders in the first period at the 5% significance level.
ders. We then analyzed each data set identically to the analysis presented above. To generate the simulated data sets, simulated offers are set equal to the actual Slovak offers. Responder decisions are based on the behavior predicted by model 4; given an offer in the specific stakes treatment, model 4 is used to determine the probability that the offer is rejected; then a random draw is used to determine if the offer is rejected.25 Table III presents the results of the analysis for the 500 data sets.
The first three columns of Table III indicate how often, using only first period data, we can detect the (known) difference between stakes generated from model 4. The power is extremely low; the power to detect a difference at even the generous 10% significance level between the low and middle or the low and high stakes is only 15%. The power to detect differences at the 5% significance level is less than 5%. In other words, if the experiment is repeated many times, we would expect to detect the known difference less than one time in twenty at the 5% level. In contrast, the power to detect that offers affect rejections at the 5% level is 84%. In other words, the sample size is sufficient to detect the substantial effect of offers on rejections using only first period data, but is not large enough to detect the more subtle effect of stakes on rejections. Thus, it is HIGH STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES 25To determine the rejection probability for a given offer and stakes condition, model 4 also requires an average rejection rate (avreji) for each responder. We thus gave each simulated responder in a given stakes condition one of the Slovak responder's average rejection rates for that condition. For example, since there were 9, 17, and 14 responders in the low, middle, and high stakes who never rejected an offer, we include 9, 17, and 14 simulated responders in the low, middle, and high stakes who have an average rejection rate of 0%. Finally, we matched simulated responders to simulated proposers identically to how Slovak responders and proposers were matched. These procedures substantially reduce noise in the power tests and avoid making additional distributional assumptions about the determination of both offers and responder rejection propensities. Slonim (1997) investigated the power tests for a variety of distributional assumptions for both proposers and responders and found similar results to those presented below. not surprising that we (and prior experiments using similar sample sizes) are unable to detect differences in rejection frequencies in the first period.26
The last four columns of Table III report power test results when using all ten periods. The power to detect a difference at the 5% level between the low and middle stakes is now extremely high (90% power) and at the 5% level we always detect the difference between the low and high stakes (100% power).
In summary, higher stakes responders are more likely to behave consistently with subgame perfect equilibrium in the sense that they reject fewer offers for proportionally equivalent shares of the pie. These effects are most significant when stakes differ by a factor of 25 and are also significant when the stakes differ by a factor of 5. Comparing these results with first round results and results from previous studies (which do not detect differences in responder behavior) indicates the value of multiple observations per subject; in first round behavior and one-shot games significant differences are not detected.
Though responders were generally more willing to accept proportionally smaller offers in higher stakes, it was not the case that proposers could make small offers with impunity; some responders rejected substantial monetary sums. For example, three out of 22 responders rejected a 40% offer in the high stakes condition one time, thus sacrificing 600 Sk (20 to 30 hours wages). Further, 9 out of 16 offers between 20 and 24.5% (300 to 370 Sk) were rejected. Hence, higher stakes decreased the willingness of responders to reject disproportionate offers, but did not cause behavior to be consistent with perfect equilibria even when it cost one or more days' wages.
Proposer Behavior
Higher stakes may induce proposers to make lower offers for at least two reasons. First, proposers may obtain utility from both monetary rewards and fairness (Ochs and Roth (1989) To investigate the effect of stakes on offers, we do not analyze the small group of subjects who made a substantial number of offers greater than 50% 6 Prescriptively, we investigated what sample size is needed to achieve adequate power so that we could confidently expect to observe the difference in stakes predicted by model 4. We increased the sample size and found that not until a sample size of 5 times the Slovak sample size are we able to achieve at least 75% power to detect a significant difference at the 5% level between the low and middle stakes conditions and not until a sample size of 4 times the Slovak sample size are we able to detect a significant difference at the 5% level between the low and high stakes conditions. Thus, increasing the stakes by a factor of 25, one would need approximately 100 responders in each condition to detect a significant stakes effect at the 5% level with 75% power when analyzing first period behavior (or a one shot experiment). since we do not study (nor propose a model for) this particular behavior.27 The data, after removing subjects who made at least four offers greater than 50%, contain no subject who made more than 2 offers above 50%. Note that offers greater than 50% occurred almost equally in each stakes condition (about 7%) and in each round; thus removing them does not systematically influence a particular round or stakes condition. We also exclude subject number 401 from the analysis. This subject's offer in all ten rounds was 5 (.5% of the pie), which was rejected in all but the eighth round.28 We exclude this subject because his average offer was 3 standard deviations below the next lowest subject's average offer (220 by subject number 1003) and 5 standard deviations below the average offer of all subjects' average offers. The exclusion of this subject has no significant effect on the results. After removing subjects who made more than two offers greater than 50% and one who always offered .5%, there are 23, 29, and 23 subjects in the low, middle, and high conditions, respectively.
Comparing first round offers across stakes, mean (median) offers are 451 (465), 460 (480), and 423 (450) in the low, middle, and high stakes conditions. Although offers are lower in the highest stakes condition, pairwise comparisons cannot reject that offers are the same across stakes (one-tailed t tests and Wilcoxian, Median, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric tests cannot reject no difference; p > .05 for every pairwise comparison). This inability to reject that stakes do not influence offers is consistent with the results of Hoffman et al. (1996) and Cameron (1995) .
The current design gives us the opportunity to test whether having multiple observations per subject may enable us to detect any significant differences. Figure 3a shows average offers over time. Notice that middle and low stakes average offers are similar in the first two rounds and both higher than high stakes offers, but for the last six rounds middle and high stakes average offers are similar and both lower than low stakes offers. The middle stakes offers tend to decrease the most over time, while low stakes offers tend to neither increase nor decrease consistently over all ten rounds.
Using offers across all rounds, the following analysis of variance was run:
(7) OFFER = PIE + ROUND + SUB(PIE) + PIE * ROUND, 27We removed proposers who made at least four offers greater than 50%. The result was that 1, 3, and 2 proposers were removed from the analysis in the low, middle, and high stakes conditions. All remaining proposers made no more than two offers greater than 50%. The number of offers above 50% that were removed was almost exactly 2/3 of the total number of offers greater than 50% made in each condition. By removing these subjects, the average offer removed in each condition was 550, 504, and 565 in the low, middle, and high stakes. Removal of these subjects does not affect the results in any significant way. The subjects removed were subjects number 301, 405, 506, 810, 904, and 1004. (These subjects are included in the summary statistics in Table I (top row) where PIE captures the three stakes levels, ROUND represents the (linear) amount of experience a player has (ROUND = 1 in round 1, etc.), SUB(PIE) captures the (dependent) fixed subject effects, noting that subjects are nested within a single PIE treatment, and PIE * ROUND captures any unique interaction between experience and stakes effects.29 Table IV summarizes the results and Figure 3b shows the predicted offers from the model. There is a significant interaction between stakes and round between the middle and low stakes conditions (F = 10.30, p < .01) and a marginally significant interaction between stakes and round for the middle and high stakes conditions (F = 2.94, p < .10). Middle stakes offers are decreasing more than either the low or high stakes conditions (Figure 3b shows this steeper slope). Because of this interaction, we cannot investigate a main effect between the middle stakes and the other two conditions.30 However, comparing the high and low stakes conditions, where no interaction occurs, we cannot reject that high stakes offers are the same as low stakes offers (f= 1.14, p > .20).
Although stakes have no main effect on offers, offers decreased significantly more in the middle than in the low stakes. We now explore whether the different learning patterns across treatments can be explained by initial differ- 29For a detailed description of analysis of variance, see Winer (1971) . The ANOVA model assumes experience has a linear effect on offers. Although experience may have nonlinear effects on offers, we found no significant differences between the linear and several nonlinear models. The linear model has out-of-sample concerns, such as suggesting that offers in high rounds (e.g., rounds greater than 1000) may be greater or less than the size of the pie. We limit our conclusions to the scope of the ten rounds of the experiment and do not extrapolate beyond them.
30It is meaningless to talk about an overall difference between offers in the middle stakes and the other two conditions because the interaction signifies that the effect of stakes depends critically on the amount of experience. This result can be seen in Figures 3a or 3b where middle stakes offers are falling relative to low stakes offers; in early rounds middle and low stakes offers are similar, but in later rounds middle stakes offers are lower. ences across stakes among proposers. One potentially important difference among inexperienced proposers is that no proposer in the low stakes made an offer below 35% of the pie in the first round, whereas seven proposers in the higher two conditions made offers less than 35%. One hypothesis is that these initial differences rather than differences among responders could cause the different learning patterns.
Figures 4a and 5a separate the behavior of proposers who in round 1 made an offer of at least 35% (4a) from those who made an offer less than 35% (5a). Figures 4b and 5b plot regression results (model 7) for these offers. Figure 4b shows that average offers in the higher two stakes conditions fall over time while there is no change in offers in the low stakes condition when round 1 offers are at least 35%. The interaction between round and pie size is highly significant (F > 15, p < .0001 for both middle vs. low and high vs. low comparisons) and there is no difference between the two higher stakes conditions (F = 0.14, p > .40). Thus, when proposers initially made similar offers across stakes (defined here as offers of at least 35% in the first round), higher stakes proposers decreased their offers more than low stakes proposers, indicating that initial differences among proposers cannot explain the different observed learning patterns.
Figures 5a and 5b show that high stakes proposers who initially make relatively small offers increase their offers compared to middle stakes proposers.31 Comparing Figures 3b, 4b , and 5b, the few proposers who increased their average offers in the highest stakes condition (Figure 5b ) explain why the overall average offers in the highest stakes do not decrease much; these few proposers in early rounds bring down and in later rounds bring up the average offer of all high stakes proposers. In the middle stakes condition, however, proposers who initially made low offers (less than 35%) continued to make relatively low offers (less than 35%) and hence did not retard the overall average offer from falling over time.
LEARNING
The current results indicate that offers by inexperienced subjects are alike across stakes, but become different with experience. This is similar to that observed by Roth et al. (1991) in comparing different subject pools. The Roth and Erev (1995) reinforcement learning model was successfully used to predict the different learning behavior observed in those experiments. If the learning model can also predict the different learning behavior in the different stakes conditions in the current experiment, then one question the learning model can address is whether the initial differences in proposer behavior or the differences 31Since only 7 subjects made offers less than 35% in period 1 in the higher two stakes conditions, statistical analysis of their offers is omitted. in responder behavior can explain the different learning patterns across the stakes treatments.
The reinforcement learning model assumes each player has an initial propensity to play each of a finite number of pure strategies (see Roth and Erev for a full description of the model). The propensity to play each pure strategy is updated (reinforced) each time the strategy is played, by adding the monetary payoff just earned to the current propensity to play the strategy. For each subject, the probability of playing a strategy equals the propensity to play the strategy divided by the sum of the propensities of all the strategies. The learning model is investigated by having simulated proposers and responders play each other in a simulation of the experimental environment. For brevity we omit the details of the simulations we have run of the current experiment.
We used the behavior of experimental proposers and responders within the first two rounds of each treatment to generate initial propensities for simulated proposers and responders.32 With these initial propensities, 5,000 simulations were run for each treatment. Although simulated offers changed more slowly than experimental offers, the direction of learning for each treatment was the same for simulated and experimental offers. Consistent with the experimental results, simulated middle stakes offers decreased most, highest stakes offers decreased second most, and lowest stakes offers decreased least.
We next explored whether the different learning patterns across treatments can be explained by initial differences across stakes among proposers or by the lower likelihood of rejection in higher stakes among responders. The simulation results show that no matter what the initial propensities of proposers, the change in offers over time depends critically on the responders they played against. If proposers play against lower stakes responders, offers fall the least (increase the most) relative to playing against either middle or high stakes responders. The learning model thus suggests that the different learning behavior observed is the result of the lower rejection rates observed in the higher stakes; all simulated proposers learn to lower offers when playing against middle and high stakes responders while they all learn to increase offers when playing against low stakes responders.33
CONCLUSIONS
Our experimental results for both the market and ultimatum games support the conclusion that, both when observed behavior conforms to perfect equilibrium predictions and when it does not, behavior of inexperienced players may be robust to large increases in rewards. Our ultimatum game results confirm prior experimental results in this regard, while in other respects they considerably extend what has previously been observed. 32 Roth and Erev (1995) describe the process used to determine initial propensities. See also Erev and Roth (1998 As discussed earlier, a number of experiments have now established the fact that single-play ultimatum game behavior is quite robust, and does not approach the perfect equilibrium predictions (for either player) even when stakes are quite high. Perhaps the most compelling of these is the experiment of Cameron (1995), which detected no change in behavior even in the face of a change in stakes by a factor of 40. Our results are quite consistent with this: in round 1, behavior in all three of our treatments is quite similar, and far from the perfect equilibrium predictions.
Of course the failure to detect statistically significant differences does not mean that not even small differences exist. Variables like rejection frequency present a particularly difficult case, since only the smaller observed offers are rejected with high frequency, and such offers are rare, so that trying to detect differences in first-round rejection rates would require impractically large samples. The learning model of Roth and Erev (1995) predicts that small initial differences in rejection frequencies should be reflected in increasingly different proposals as players have an opportunity to learn about the game, and the experiment reported here was designed to explore this prediction.
Two differences in the ultimatum game behavior were detected as stakes increased. First, responders (pooled over all rounds) rejected offers less often. Second, there was an interaction effect between stakes and experience: in the higher stakes conditions the offers decreased with experience. The experiment and learning simulations suggest that small initial differences in proposer behavior cannot account for the differential learning behavior, but that the lower likelihood of being rejected in the higher stakes can account for higher stakes proposers learning to make lower offers.
Notice that the different patterns of learning we observe among proposers in the different stakes conditions of the experiment, and the hypothesis about its origin in the different rejection frequencies which the learning model provides, tell us something about rejection frequencies which the simple statistical analysis cannot. Not only are the differences in rejection frequencies across stakes statistically significant, apparently they are also behaviorally important.
In general, new kinds of theory allow us to explore different kinds of questions, and suggest different kinds of experiments. We therefore view this paper not only as an experiment designed to explore the effects of large changes in stakes, but also as an attempt to take seriously the demands that theories of learning place on (and the opportunities they provide for) experimental design and analysis. 
